The United States District Court for the District of Oregon recently established, in a landmark decision, the utmost protections for the environment. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). While this is not a federal circuit court of appeals nor the Supreme Court, it certainly highlights the importance that some judiciaries are placing on protecting the environment as our ozone layer is deteriorating.
The Plaintiffs in this civil rights action include a group of young people between the ages of eight and nineteen; Earth Guardians; and Dr. James Hanson. The plaintiff brought this civil rights lawsuit alleging substantive due process violations against the President of the United States and various federal administrative agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency. The Plaintiffs are seeking “(1) a declaration [that] their constitutional and public trust rights have been violated and (2) an order enjoining defendants from violating those rights and directed defendants to develop a plan to reduce CO2emissions.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. The defendants argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed based on “lack of jurisdiction because the case presents non-justiciable political questions, plaintiffs lack standing to sue, and federal public trust claims cannot be asserted against the federal government.” Id. at 1235.
In denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the court carefully went on to address each issue in the appropriate order. The court paid special attention to the fact that they were not issuing a remedy, or ruling on the merits of the matter, and if that time would come, the court would need to exercise great care in crafting a remedy as to avoid a separations of powers issue. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
The court first addressed whether the issue presented a non-justiciable political question. In doing so, the court applied the six-factor test identified in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Those factors are: “[(1) A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). In determining that the political question doctrine was not a barrier for plaintiffs’ claims, the court analogized to the plaintiffs from Baker, who were also minors who were unable to vote. In this analogy, those minors need to look to, and depend upon, others to protect their political interests. See generally Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
The court next addressed standing providing that “a threshold question in every federal case is… whether at least one plaintiff has standing.” Id. at 1242 (citing Thomas v. Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2009). In arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the government contended that the injuries of the minor plaintiffs assert (i.e. dry conditions from forest fires aggravating asthma, flooding, record high temperatures killing crops, etc.) are not particular to plaintiffs because they are caused by climate change, which broadly affects the entire planet and thus renders plaintiff’s injuries nonjusticiable generalized grievances. Id. at 1243. In finding that the plaintiffs have adequate standing, the court found that the harm to plaintiffs’ personal, economic, and aesthetic interests defeat the generalized grievance rule. Additionally, the court noted that plaintiffs met the injunctive relief standard by showing that their injuries are “ongoing or likely to recur.” Id. at 1244 (citing Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1197 (9th Cir. 2016).
Moving onto the due process claims, the plaintiffs claim that their due process rights were violated because the defendants directly “caus[ed] atmospheric CO2to rise to levels that dangerously interfere with a stable climate system required alike by our nation…” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248. The court engaged in a fundamental rights analysis and provided a narrow determination. “In framing the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance to provide some protection against the constitutionalizing of all environmental claims. … acknowledgement of this fundamental right does not transform any minor or even moderate act that contributes to the warming of the planet into a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1250.
The court lastly addressed whether federal public trust claims can be asserted against the federal government. Broadly, “public trust” refers to the fundamental understanding that no government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers. The first court the address the applicability of the public trust doctrine to natural resources was the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 1821, in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.L.J. 1 (N.J. 1821). In addressing the scope of the public trust assets, the Oregon District Court recognized that the plaintiffs asserted a number of injuries that related “to the effects of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures” and not just atmospheric damages, establishing that the public trust doctrine applies. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256. Additionally, the defendants’ claims that the public trust doctrine does not apply to the federal government is without merit. Primarily the court looked to persuasive arguments from other courts that have held that public trust doctrine applies to the federal government and others that have held the opposite. Of note, two district courts have concluded that the public trust doctrine applies to the federal government. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in the City of Boston, Suffolk County, Mass., 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981); City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Therefore, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims are cognizable in federal court.
In recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims were cognizable, the court is showing its interest in protecting environmental interests. Additionally, this case is distinguishable from most environmental claims brought under the Clean Water Act or Clear Air Act. The plaintiffs in this case allege that the defendants’ actions have so profoundly damaged our home planet, they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life and liberty.
Upon the denial of their motions to dismiss, the defendants subsequently filed a motion for leave to appeal which was denied in May, 2017. See Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-1517-TC, 2017 WL 9249531 (D. Or. May 1, 2017). Thereafter, a petition for a writ of mandamus was denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 884 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2018). The case is currently stayed pending an interlocutory appeal.