{"id":13590,"date":"2021-12-22T14:48:07","date_gmt":"2021-12-22T19:48:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/?p=13590"},"modified":"2021-12-22T14:48:10","modified_gmt":"2021-12-22T19:48:10","slug":"state-and-federal-legislators-challenge-decades-old-supreme-court-abortion-law-precedents-from-both-sides-of-aisle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/2021\/12\/22\/state-and-federal-legislators-challenge-decades-old-supreme-court-abortion-law-precedents-from-both-sides-of-aisle\/","title":{"rendered":"State and Federal Legislators Challenge Decades Old Supreme Court Abortion Law Precedents from Both Sides of Aisle."},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Image via unsplash.com<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By David McPeak, Editor in Chief<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Should Americans prepare for abortion policy to return to the legislative realm? Currently, the United States Supreme Court is considering whether to overturn Roe v. Wade<\/em>, which, in 1973, held that states have insufficient interest in the life of an unborn child to justify statutory bans on elective abortion prior to viability.[1]<\/sup><\/a> The groundwork for Roe <\/em>was laid in preceding cases where the Court found that a fundamental \u201cright to privacy\u201d exists as a substantive component of individual liberty protected under the 14th<\/sup> Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause.[2]<\/sup><\/a> The Court extended that same analysis in expansive fashion in Roe, <\/em>where it <\/em>determined that the fundamental right to privacy also includes the right to abortion.[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, viability means the point at which a child can survive outside of the womb with the aid of current medical technologies.[4]<\/sup><\/a> In 1973 at the time Roe<\/em> was decided, viability typically meant 24-28 weeks, or roughly upon entering the third trimester.[5]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, the Court fashioned a regime of rules revolving around a trimester framework, where it held that a state\u2019s legitimate interest in the \u201chealth of the mother\u201d became \u201ccompelling\u201d at the beginning of the second trimester, and the state interest in the life of the unborn child became \u201ccompelling\u201d at the point of viability in the third trimester.[6]<\/sup><\/a> In short, states were powerless under Roe<\/em> to interfere with abortion during the first trimester, could narrowly regulate to protect maternal health in the second trimester, and could proscribe elective abortions all together in the third.  In application, Roe\u2019s <\/em>strict scrutiny, trimester framework, meant that laws regulating abortion before the six-month mark were almost certain to be held unconstitutional. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, <\/em>the Supreme Court revisited Roe <\/em>when it considered a challenge to various pre-viability abortion regulations enacted by the state of Pennsylvania.[7]<\/sup><\/a> A Plurality of the Casey<\/em> Court purported to retain Roe\u2019s<\/em> central holding, but also conceded that Roe,<\/em> and subsequent cases, inadequately accounted for the \u201cprofound state interest in potential life.\u201d<\/em>[8]<\/sup><\/a> Casey\u2019s<\/em> plurality opinion, consisting of Justices O\u2019Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, sought to better accommodate state pre-viability interests by re-engineering the framework for which courts review pre-viability regulations. Under Casey<\/em>, the Court clawed back a modicum of the liberty interest defined just 19 years prior in Roe<\/em>, holding that states have a \u201clegitimate\u201d pre-viability interest, but only to the extent that abortion regulations do not result in an \u201cundue burden\u201d on women seeking to terminate pre-viability pregnancies.[9]<\/sup><\/a>  In applying that test, Casey\u2019s<\/em> Plurality upheld Pennsylvania\u2019s 24-hour waiting period provision but struck its provision requiring spousal notice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Out of the gate, Casey\u2019s<\/em> dissenting opinions criticized the novel \u201cundue burden test\u201d as unmoored from the Constitution and as \u201cinherently manipulable.\u201d[10]<\/sup><\/a> Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist put it most colorfully when he characterized the Plurality\u2019s elaborate stare decisis<\/em> analysis as a \u201cfa\u00e7ade\u201d that \u201cstands as a sort of judicial Potemkin Village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as monument to the importance of adhering to precedent.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a> Justice Scalia also rejected Casey\u2019s<\/em> stare decisis<\/em> analysis, confessing that he had not previously heard of the Plurality\u2019s \u201cnew keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version\u201d of that doctrine.[12]<\/sup><\/a> At the other end of the spectrum, Justice Blackmun would have struck the entirety of Pennsylvania\u2019s regulatory regime, insisting that any abortion regulation be subjected to the highest judicial scrutiny.[13]<\/sup><\/a> Perhaps foreshadowing those who criticize Casey\u2019s<\/em> undue burden regime as unworkable in any objective sense, Justice Blackmun took solace that the Plurality left room for overturning the same provisions it just upheld\u2014if on remand the factual record were further developed.[14]<\/sup><\/a>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whatever the aim of Casey\u2019s<\/em> Plurality at the time, abortion has only grown as a fracturing force. In the years since Casey<\/em>, the weighty issues swirling around abortion have exacted an outsized role in every Supreme Court nomination, thus placing the Court squarely in the political arena where Justices constantly complain it has no business existing. At the same time, both political parties are guilty of cynically wielding the issue to disparage opponents. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, Roe<\/em> has never been on shakier ground. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health<\/em>, the Court is being called to answer \u201cwhether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortion are unconstitutional.\u201d[15]<\/sup><\/a> Dobbs<\/em> stems from a 2018 Mississippi law which bans most elective abortions after 15 weeks.[16]<\/sup><\/a> Mississippi (\u201cPetitioner\u201d) argues the Court wrongly decided Roe<\/em> in the first instance\u2014thus any precedential value afforded to what remains of Roe<\/em> within Casey<\/em> is ill gotten.[17]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To that end, Petitioner urges the Court not to employ its prudential stare decisis<\/em> doctrine as a mechanism to cover for wrong decisions. Underscoring that argument, Petitioner suggests that, among other things, the pre-viability guideposts are outdated, the undue burden standard has proven unworkable,[18]<\/sup><\/a> and both lack any constitutional construct\u2014textual or otherwise.[19]<\/sup><\/a> It asks that the Court overrule Roe<\/em> and Casey\u2019s<\/em> heightened scrutiny tests in favor of ordinary rational basis review, and uphold Mississippi\u2019s law because it \u201creasonably furthers valid interest in protecting unborn life, women\u2019s health, and the medical profession\u2019s integrity.\u201d[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Respondent Jackson\u2019s Women\u2019s Health is the only licensed abortion provider in the state of Mississippi.[21]<\/sup><\/a> In arguing that Mississippi\u2019s Gestational Age Act unconstitutionally violates Casey<\/em> by placing an undue burden on as sub-set of pre-viability abortions, Respondent attempts to concentrate the Court\u2019s attention on the broader, societal implications it says will follow a reversal of abortion precedent.[22]<\/sup><\/a> The thrust of Respondent\u2019s argument is that the Court carefully addressed the same issues raised by Petitioner when it decided Casey,[23]<\/strong><\/sup><\/a><\/em> that no factual or legal developments over the past 30 years support reversal,[24]<\/sup><\/a> and that Mississippi is motivated, at least in part, by the makeup of the current Court.[25]<\/sup><\/a> In that regard, Respondent seeks to  assert pressure on the Court\u2019s instinct to adhere to stare decisis, <\/em>characterizingCasey<\/em> as \u201cprecedent on top of precedent.\u201d[26]<\/sup><\/a> Respondent further focuses on the premise that the Court\u2019s refusal to toss Roe<\/em> and Casey<\/em> has resulted in reliance interests in which women now organize their lives around the belief that the ability to terminate pre-viability pregnancies exists as a fundamental constitutional right.[27]<\/sup><\/a> Respondent asserts, at length, that women\u2019s societal ascension in the past half-century would not have been realized but for the Court\u2019s watershed decision in Roe<\/em>.[28]<\/sup><\/a>  Moreover, they urge the Court to heavily weigh the impact that turning its back on nearly 50 years of abortion precedent would have on the Court\u2019s legitimacy.[29]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Texas has passed a law which challenges Roe\u2019s <\/em>central holding even more aggressively than Mississippi\u2019s, which the Court refused to stay while that law is being litigated.[30]<\/sup><\/a> At the federal level, the House of Representatives recently passed legislation to codify Roe<\/em> and Casey<\/em> while also limiting states\u2019 ability to regulate abortion in ways the Court has previously held to be consistent with Casey\u2019s<\/em> undue burden regime.[31]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health<\/em> on December 1, 2021. A decision is still forthcoming as of this writing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner at 15, Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health, No. 19-1392 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2021).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> Roe v. Wade ,410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner, supra<\/em>, at 40.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> Id. at 878. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> Id. at 878.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> Id. at 986. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., dissenting). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/sup><\/a> Id. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner, supra<\/em>, at 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/sup><\/a> Mississippi\u2019s Gestational Age Act, Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 41-41-191. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner, supra<\/em>, at 2. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner, supra<\/em>, at 19. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner, supra<\/em>, at 17. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Petitioner, supra<\/em>, at 11. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent at 6, Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health, No. 19-1392 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2021).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 2. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 3. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 23. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 6. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 9. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[27]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 37. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 37-41. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[29]<\/sup><\/a> Brief for Respondent, supra<\/em>, at 2. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[30]<\/sup><\/a> Juliegrace Brufke, House Passes Bill to Codify Roe v. Wade in Wake of Texas Abortion Law, The New York Post (Sept. 24, 2021, 3:19 PM), https:\/\/nypost.com\/2021\/09\/24\/house-passes-bill-to-codify-roe-v-wade-in-wake-of-texas-abortion-law\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[31]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Image via unsplash.com By David McPeak, Editor in Chief Should Americans prepare for abortion policy to return to the legislative realm? Currently, the United States Supreme Court is considering whether to overturn Roe v. Wade, which, in 1973, held that states have insufficient interest in the life of an unborn child [\u2026] <\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

Read More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":13032,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2092,7],"tags":[2394,2669],"class_list":["post-13590","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-features-articles","category-juris-features","tag-features","tag-juris-features"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13590","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13590"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13590\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13592,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13590\/revisions\/13592"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13032"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13590"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13590"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/juris\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13590"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}