By Mariah Mandy, Staff Writer
Imagine This…
You are fishing off a public dock, enjoying a pleasant summer day, when a stranger walks onto the same dock and begins fishing nearby. You and the stranger quietly fish in peace for some time, sharing the same dock as you indulge in the tranquility of the lake. Suddenly, the stranger hooks a large fish and stands up in order to reel in his catch.
When the fish nears the dock, the stranger leans over the water and attempts to scoop the fish into his net. As the stranger thrusts the net deep into the water, he loses his balance and falls into the lake. It is immediately evident that the stranger cannot swim. He begins flailing his arms and yelling for help, clearly struggling to stay afloat. However, you continue fishing, paying no mind to the stranger drowning just yards away.
A Background of the Duty Standard
When determining whether the actions of an individual are negligent, the Court must first decide whether the individual had a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.[1] In other words, does the individual have a duty to change his behavior in order to avoid injury to another person?
In Vaughan v. Menlove, the defendant contended the Court should look at whether the defendant acted honestly and to the best of his own judgement. The Court rejected this contention, stating that the judgment of each individual would be as variable as the length of each individual’s foot. Instead, the Court held that we ought to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.[2] Therefore, the reasonably prudent person standard is applied objectively to the actions of individuals.
No Duty to Rescue
Oftentimes, the duty standard requires that a person not engage in certain behavior to avoid acting negligently. However, in Yania v. Bigan, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examined whether individuals have an affirmative duty to act in certain situations.[3] Specifically, whether an individual is required to rescue a person in peril. In Yania, John Bigan was engaged in coal strip-mining, and he had created large trenches in order to remove the coal underneath earthen overburden. One trench was 16 to 18 feet high and contained 8 to 10 feet of water. Joseph Yania, the operator of a different coal strip-mine went to Bigan’s property to discuss a matter of business. Bigan asked Yania to help him start the water pump, and Yania jumped into the water and drowned.[4]
One of the three negligence claims against Bigan was his failure to rescue Yania after he jumped into the water. The Court held that the mere fact Bigan saw Yania in a position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal obligation to go to his rescue unless Bigan was legally responsible, in whole or in part, for placing Yania in the perilous position. Furthermore, the Court opined that the complaint did not aver any facts which impose upon Bigan legal responsibility for placing Yania in the dangerous position in the water, and absent such legal responsibility, the law imposes on Bigan no duty of rescue.[5]
The Moral Spectrum
Under the no duty to rescue rule, you are under no obligation to rescue the drowning fisherman in the above hypothetical. This doctrine creates a moral spectrum of conflicting interests. At one end of the spectrum, people in a civilized society are morally outraged by a person’s refusal to rescue someone in life-threatening peril. Indeed, “[t]he law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of common decency, to come to the aid of another human being who is in danger.”[6]
At the other end of the spectrum, people want to protect individual autonomy. The imposition of an affirmative duty to rescue could potentially remove our freedom to choose whether to act. Balancing these interests has led the courts to maintain the no duty to rescue rule, while recognizing various exceptions. Therefore, the courts have left the question of whether you should jump into the water and save an absolute stranger a question of your own moral convictions.
Sources
[1] Weaver, Bauman, Cross, Klien, Martin, Zwier “Torts Cases, Problems, and Exercises”
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
