{"id":393,"date":"2018-04-08T14:57:52","date_gmt":"2018-04-08T14:57:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/?p=393"},"modified":"2018-04-18T14:05:58","modified_gmt":"2018-04-18T14:05:58","slug":"flint-water-crisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/flint-water-crisis\/","title":{"rendered":"Flint Water Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In 2011, a mismanaged state government effectively took the reins from elected municipal officials and maligned the largely lower income and racially diverse population of Flint. The result was a cacophony of events that ushered in an unprecedented period of fear and confusion for the citizens of this southeastern Michigan town.<\/p>\n<p>In 2011, Michigan enacted the Emergency Manager Law (\u201cEML\u201d) under the guise of the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act1. Furtherance of \u201chealth, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Michigan\u201d was touted as one of The EML\u2019s purposes. Practically speaking, The EML effectively \u201cguts\u201d the city of its charter, elected officials, and usual business processes while leaving intact the city\u2019s legal status. The democratic concern with the EML is that it grants sweeping power to state-appointed officials at the expense of the city\u2019s elected officials. After the enactment of The EML, Flint was one of the first cities to come under state manager appointment. At that time, Flint was one of four Michigan cities with a predominantly African American population under the appointment of an emergency manager.<\/p>\n<p>The events that occurred in Flint from the emergency manager\u2019s appointment were on a trajectory for disaster. In April 2014 Emergency Manager Darnell Earley officially switched Flint\u2019s water source from the Detroit River to the Flint River. Though the waters of the Flint River were significantly more corrosive than the waters of the Detroit River, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (\u201cMDEQ\u201d) decided not to add the necessary corrosion control chemicals. State officials assured residents that the water was safe to drink despite mounting evidence that it was not.<\/p>\n<p>In October of 2014, General Motors discontinued its use of Flint water at its Flint facility after noticing rust on its newly manufactured automotive parts. Earley acknowledged the problem, but refused to switch the city\u2019s water supply back to the Detroit River because it was cost-prohibitive.10 In response the state sampled Flint\u2019s water in December of 2015, and found that exceedingly high lead levels triggered the need for corrosion control measures. The state of Michigan did not inform Flint of this finding.<\/p>\n<p>In March of 2015, the Flint City Council voted 7:1 to return to Detroit water, however its vote was non-binding because the city was under the authority of the state emergency manager. In June of 2015, the federal government became involved through EPA Region 5. Region 5\u2019s finding prompted EPA regulations manager Del Toral to write a memo expressing his deep concern for the absence of corrosion control programs in Flint\u2019s water treatment procedure.14 According to Del Toral\u2019s memo, the lack of treatment posed major concerns for the public health of Flint\u2019s citizens. Del Toral\u2019s assessment proved accurate when a September 2015 study indicated increased blood-lead levels in Flint children since the city had switched to the Flint River<\/p>\n<p>Sadly, despite Del Toral\u2019s memo raising EPA awareness of the water\u2019s high lead levels from mid-2015, the EPA failed to act until January of 2016. Because lead has the most severe effects on the central nervous system, the issue of lead pervasive in Flint\u2019s water supply was time critical; and the EPA, the MDEQ and emergency managers failed Flint residents. The Flint water crisis began with Earley, via EML authorization, switching Flint\u2019s water supply.18 What followed was a bevy of federal and state officials acting in concert to deprive Flint\u2019s citizens the most basic of life sustaining needs.<\/p>\n<p>Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. \u00a7 28.702 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through 2018 Public Act 18)<br \/>\nMichelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 577, 581 (2011).<br \/>\nCourtney L. Anderson; Taking Flint, 17 Hous. J. Health L. &#038; Pol&#8217;y 107 at 119.<br \/>\nCourtney Ann Warren, An American Reset &#8211; Safe Water &#038; A Workable Model Of Federalism, 27 Duke Envtl. L. &#038; Pol&#8217;y F. 51<br \/>\nFlint Water Crisis Fast Facts, CNN, http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2016\/03\/04\/ us\/flint-water-crisis-fast-facts\/ (last updated Apr. 10, 2017, 12:38 PM).<br \/>\nLocal Financial Stability &#038; Choice Act, 2012 Mi. P.A. 436.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In 2011, a mismanaged state government effectively took the reins from elected municipal officials and maligned the largely lower income and racially diverse population of Flint. The result was a cacophony of events that ushered in an unprecedented period of fear and confusion for the citizens of this southeastern Michigan [\u2026] <\/p>\n<div class=\"clear\"><\/div>\n<p><a class=\"more_link clearfix\" href=\"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/flint-water-crisis\/\" rel=\"nofollow\">Read More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-393","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-featured","category-legal-voice"],"aioseo_notices":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paIRgz-6l","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/393","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=393"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/393\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":394,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/393\/revisions\/394"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=393"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=393"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.law.duq.edu\/joule\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=393"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}